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8 ‘The streets belong to who?’: ‘Governance’ and the Urban Informal 
Sector in Jakarta, Indonesia 
 
Ian Douglas Wilson  
Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, Western Australia 
 
The aim of this case study is to assess the nature and impact of policy relating to governance 
of the Urban Informal Sector (UIS) in Jakarta, Indonesia, focusing in particular upon the 
degree of representation of various stakeholders and sets of interests in existing policy. After 
outlining the background context of the issue, focusing upon Jakarta, it will ask; what has 
been the nature and extent of this representation in current policy, what political and 
economic interests have dominated policy debate, what efforts have been made to represent 
the sector and what can potentially be done to ensure that representation translates into 
effective and equitable governance strategies that balance the needs of UIS workers with 
those of other relevant stakeholders.  
 
Defining the Urban Informal Sector 
By way of a general introduction, the informal sector covers a wide range of economic and 
income generating activities, including casual jobs, small-scale entrepreneurial activity, home 
industry and part-time work; work operating outside of formal government regulation and 
taxation (including the black-market or illegal), making it a complex and problematic area of 
governance. The term ‘informal sector’ is meant to capture the characteristics of that sector 
of the labour force which is not part of the regulated employed sector. This study will focus 
upon one of the more conspicuous and contentious sectors of the UIS in Jakarta; petty street 
traders and vendors known more as pedagang kaki lima or PKL. Due to the often transient 
and fluxing nature of street trading it is difficult to find accurate estimates of the numbers of 
PKL in Jakarta with figures ranging from 140,000 to over 350,000. In particular, during 
times of economic crisis or downturn the numbers of PKL can quickly expand. For example 
during the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997 the number of vendors and itinerant traders 
jumped from 95,000 to 270,000 in the space of a few months (Firman 1999) i.   
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The Global Development Research Centre has identified a number of criteria distinctive of 
the UIS: a) It operates in open spaces, (b) it is housed in a temporary or semi-permanent 
structure, (c) it does not operate from spaces assigned by the government, municipality or 
private organizers of officially recognized market-places, (d) it operates from residences or 
backyards, and (e) it is not registered ii. Employment instability based on casual ad hoc 
employment means that UIS workers often engage in petty trade, and as such do not receive 
salary or benefits from a stable employer. While UIS workers in Indonesia are not by 
definition poor, the urban poor make up an overwhelming majority of the UIS iii. The 2006 
World Bank Report Making the New Indonesia Work for the Poor gives figures that 60% of 
all Indonesians work in the informal sector, the number rising to 75% amongst those they 
define as the poor (World Bank 2006) iii  In 2001 Blunch et al cite a figure of 77.9% for the 
proportion of the Indonesian urban work force located in the informal sector (Blunch, 
Canagarajah and Raju 2001). This compares with 66.9% in the Philippines and 51.4% in 
Thailand (Blunch, Canagarajah and Raju 2001). In 2008 it was estimated that as many as 60 
million out of Indonesia’s workforce of 97 million worked in the informal sector (Khalik 
2008).  
 
With the high dependence of formal sector employment upon global markets, the informal 
sector has continued to expand particularly during times of global economic downturn such 
as the Asia Financial Crisis of 1997. As such it has provided a safety net against abject 
poverty in the absence of extensive functioning social welfare services in Indonesia. Portes 
and Hoffman have documented globally the dramatic growth in what they describe as an 
‘informal proletariat’; “the sum of own-account workers minus professionals and technicians, 
domestic workers, and paid and unpaid workers in microenterprises” (Portes and Hoffman 
2003: 55). The implementation of neo-liberal policies and the privatisation of markets, 
particularly in developing countries, has seen an overall shrinkage of public sector jobs and 
‘forced entrepreneurialism’ and invented self-employment for many (Centeno and Portes 
2006). This trend of informalisation has also accelerated processes of urbanisation (Davis 
2004). The continued lack of economic opportunities in rural areas makes migration to urban 
centres a pragmatic survival strategy for many, swelling the size of cities and overwhelming 
the already limited absorptive potential of the formal sector. The urban informal sector is a 
global socio-economic reality that will continue to grow in the future. As Centeno and Portes 
state, its expansion is also “a poignant reflection of the distortions and failures of the 
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM: POLITICS AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM  
13 - 14 DECEMBER, 2010 
MURDOCH UNIVERSITY, PERTH 
 
115 
development process”, and “simultaneously a key actor for implementing any solution to 
them” (Centeno and Portes 2006: 24).  
 
With these figures and economic and population trends in mind, the characteristics and 
dynamics of the urban informal sector in Indonesia should be a matter of high priority for 
government and policy makers. Some of the key characteristics of the urban informal sector 
in comparison to formal sector workers are: 
• They have minimal income security and as a result are constantly in search of work. 
Insecurity is a constant feature of their existence, and they are highly susceptible to 
income loss. 
• Their relations with their employers/clients are generally more direct and personal than 
those of formal sector workers, and they often have multiple relationships. Despite a 
common perception of informal sector workers as self-employed potential or actual 
micro-entrepreneurs (pushed by donor agencies such as the World Bank), most in fact 
work for someone else i.e. via consignment, rental of a pushcart or space or as off the 
books workers or suppliers for formal sector firms.  
• Their socio-economic and political life is primarily territorial based (neighbourhood, 
street) and not workplace based. Subsequently they have a higher consciousness and 
sensitivity to issues of space, but a diminished sense of sectoral consciousnesses. Issues 
of economic livelihood are frequently intertwined with those of housing/residency. 
• Due to the fluidity in their situation, there is a far greater degree of social heterogeneity in 
their immediate living environment. People frequently move in and out of 
neighbourhoods as fortunes, consumption patterns and demand fluctuate. This can lead to 
unique forms of social organisation (such as community based cooperatives) but can also 
inhibit the development of effective forms of community based advocacy. This 
heterogeneity, generally within crowded environments with poor infrastructure and a lack 
of basic amenities, can also contribute to the emergence of forms of social conflict and 
predatory and reactionary forms of organisation (street gangs, protection rackets, 
vigilantes).  
• There is greater flexibility as regards to time/working hours.  
• The UIS often operates in highly competitive yet unregulated markets. Markets 
frequently become oversaturated, resulting in overall reduction of profits. 
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• Largely by default they engage in more illegal activities, ranging from squatting and 
trespassing to unlicensed businesses, making them frequently subject to harassment and 
arrest by the authorities. Davis has estimated that up to 85% of urban residents in the 
developing world “occupy property illegally” (Davis 2004:15).  
• They serve an important economic role by providing affordable goods and services for 
the urban poor as well as low wage formal sector workers.  
 
Considering the significance of the UIS, in terms of the sheer numbers of people involved, its 
inherent precariousness and its crucial safety net role in relation to an often equally 
precarious formal sector, what have been the governance strategies of the Indonesian 
government towards it; how has it been represented in policy and what types of initiatives 
and support programs have been implemented to accommodate this now global product of 
hyper-urbanisation?  
 
Policy and approaches  
Throughout Indonesia UIS governance has been characterized by an informal approach. In 
practice the presence of informal sector activity in public space is frequently tolerated to 
varying degrees (often due to a lack of resources to do otherwise) however with few 
exceptions it lacks any formal legal foundation or safeguards. On a day-to-day basis in cities 
such as Jakarta, Surabaya and Medan such informal governance is often the preserve of the 
community itself, or frequently criminal and protection rackets gangs often working in 
cooperation with the police, civil ordinance officials and local authorities (Robison, Wilson, 
Meliala 2008). UIS workers are frequently subject to a range of both formal and informal 
fees paid to gangs, the police and civil ordinance officials. A study conducted by the Institute 
for Economic and Social Rights in 2007 showed that street vendors in Jakarta paid Rp. 279.8 
billion (US$27.9 million) in retributions, the majority of which were illegal (Nasir 2008) iv. A 
common situation found in the streets and neighbourhoods of Jakarta is vendors paying 
retributions to gangs and protection groups in the hope that this will prevent the extraction of 
fees from other gangs and also provide protection from harassment and eviction by the 
authorities. Often vendors are forced to pay fees to both gangs and officials, with neither 
providing any binding guarantee of security.  
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The implementation from 2001 of political decentralisation in Indonesia, and the subsequent 
demand from provincial and district level governments for an increase in locally generated 
revenue has, despite opportunities for increased public participation in development and 
planning, had a negative overall effect on informal sector workers, with many small 
enterprises being pushed into the formal economy with insufficient planning and street 
vendors evicted or ‘criminalised’ in the context of increasing competition and clashes of 
interest over the use of public space. In Jakarta part of the rationale for an intensification of 
this repressive and prohibitive approach since has been that large numbers of UIS workers 
are economic migrants to the nation’s capital and that the capacity of the city to sustainably 
absorb a greater population has already been surpassed v. This rationale is not entirely 
unfounded as Jakarta’s population has grown at a startling rate.  Totaling only 1.5 million in 
1950, according to the 2010 census it is now around 9.58 million with the greater Jakarta 
region reaching 26.6 million, making it one of  the largest metropolitan cities in Southeast 
Asia (BPS 2010) . Rapid urbanisation has been accelerated by continued under-development 
in rural areas resulting in a near constant stream of migration into the capital vi . In 2005 it 
was estimated that Jakarta had 2.4 million long term and 430,000 short term migrants from 
rural areas (Resosudarmo, Yamauchi and Effendi 2009). Street vending in particular is for 
many new migrants often one of the only viable and accessible means by which to generate 
income, hence recent and long term migrants are heavily represented.  
 
This argument however obscures the reality of limited formal employment opportunities 
even for long term Jakarta residents, and also the ways in which existing resources, space and 
infrastructure have been utilised and prioritised, and the sets of interests that have benefitted. 
As Rukmana states, “many of the problems associated with the informal sector are not 
attributes inherent to the informal sector but manifestations of unresponsive urban planning 
itself” (Rukmana 2007). Clearance of slums for example is entirely counter-productive when 
alternate places of residence and livelihood are not provided or do not exist, and in Jakarta 
such operations have been used as a means for freeing land for high-level investment 
developments (Human Rights Watch 2006). As has been well documented, capital intensive 
retail developments such as shopping malls and luxury housing estates are also placing 
unsustainable burdens on Jakarta’s physical infrastructure and environment and have been 
linked to the exacerbation of long term problems such as flooding (due to reducing natural 
catchment areas) and the attendant issue of land subsidence vii.   
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At a national level there is limited in principal recognition of the UIS in the National Spatial 
Planning Law 26/2007 which identifies the importance of the informal sector in urban areas; 
the need to incorporate it into urban planning as well as minimum standards of services and 
provisions for greater accountability in spatial planning processes (Hudalah and Woltjer 
2007). The ambiguous in principal and non-binding nature of the law however has meant that 
it is easily overlooked, or is often countered by regional and district level regulations (known 
as Peraturan Daerah, or Perda). A further Presidential decree in 2007 also stipulated that 
chain convenience stores in particular be required to assess their impact upon any traditional 
markets in close proximityviii. Similarly, national level ministers have, usually during periods 
of economic downturn, requested that street traders be left undisturbed in the interests of not 
further burdening financial pressures on the poor. These however have not been considered 
binding, or backed by concrete legislationix.  
 
However in some urban centres in Indonesia street vendors have been formally 
accommodated within planning and space allocation and involved directly in a consultative 
planning process. For example in the city of Solo, Central Java, a participatory approach 
towards the accommodation of the UIS has been adopted by the mayor Joko Widodo. Plans 
to relocate over a thousand vendors involved an extended process of negotiation and 
consultation with vendors after which they voluntarily moved to a new location, in contrast 
to the tactics of his predecessors (The Jakarta Post 2010) x. Vendors were accommodated 
within fifteen recently renovated traditional markets or provided with new street carts and 
main bus routes redirected so that there would be a constant stream of customers (Tempo, 
2009). Local regulations have also been introduced, and more importantly enforced, limiting 
the number of large malls and 24hour minimarkets (Indarini 2010). A Street Vendors 
Administration Office (Kantor Pengelolaan PKL) has been established to pursue initiatives 
for assisting and consulting directly with the UIS xi. Most significant in the Solo case, is the 
recognition of the UIS as a legitimate sector to be incorporated within development and 
planning agendas and allocated adequate resources, the most important of which is space xii. 
The Solo example, while encouraging, has however been an exception to the rule. Nationally, 
the prevailing orientation of regional regulations towards the UIS is prohibitive; indicating 
that while informally it is recognised, the prevailing tendency is to view it as illegal activity 
due to its operation outside of state regulation and its reliance upon public space.  
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Between order and disorder in ‘the city of vendors’ 
In part due to the sheer size of its population the management and politics of the UIS in 
Jakarta is far more complex than in other urban centres throughout Indonesia. The response 
from government however has been far less nuanced or accommodating than in Solo. The 
primary policy instrument used for dealing with the UIS has been the 1988 Public Order law, 
which was later revised in Regional Law No.8 2007 (FAKTA 2008) x  
iii. The Public Order law criminalises non-state sanctioned UIS activity, stipulating that it is 
illegal to sell goods or conduct business in streets, parks or other public places except in areas 
designated by the governor. The recognition of the informal sector in the 2007 National 
Spatial Planning Law was in a sense countered by a tightening of the previous Public Order 
law, which included greater penalties for illegal vending along with begging, busking and 
squatter settlements. A parting gift of outgoing governor Sutiyoso, he argued that the law was 
necessary to "to put order into things of common interest"(BBC 2007).  
 
The regular experience of violent confrontation between UIS workers and state agencies was 
in many ways shaped during the governorship of Sutiyoso (1997-2007) who waged a 
systematic campaign against the informal sector at a time when it was expanding 
dramatically in the wake of the 1997 economic crisis xiv. During the period 2001-2005 
approximately 60,000 slum dwellers were evicted whereas in 2003 alone 17,700 street 
vendors were moved on, many having their stalls demolished (FAKTA, 2004). Identity card 
checks were increased, especially at the end of the fasting month of Ramadan when 
traditionally there is an influx of new migrants. Public parks such as the National Monument 
(Monas) were fenced off and pedestrian paths narrowed to prevent vendors establishing stalls 
xv. Indigenous Betawi gangs and ethnic militias were mobilised, resulting in increased clashes 
with migrant ethnic groups predominant in street trade such as the Madurese (Wilson 2006). 
A former Jakarta military commander, Sutiyoso employed urban management techniques 
associated with the former New Order regime. His vision and concept of Jakarta, inspired by 
Singapore and Hong Kong, had no place for the UIS, which was considered an eyesore, 
source of social problems and unbefitting a modern city (Kusno 2004).  
 
This negative impact of this law and order approach upon the UIS has been compounded by 
a failure to implement and enforce existing legislation accommodative of informal economic 
activity, such as Jakarta regional law No.2/2002, which requires developers of large scale 
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retail developments (2,000-4000m2  of floor space) to allocate up to 20% of total space for 
UIS activity, and not to be within 2.5km of traditional marketsxvi. Since the passing of the 
law in 2002, there has yet to be a single development that has allocated space as stipulated in 
the regulation and a number of recent retail developments are well within the 2.5km 
exclusion zone xvii. The common practice is for powerful developers to simply buy 
themselves out of regulatory adherence, either via illegal payments to officials or other forms 
of retribution xviii.  From the perspective of developers providing space for vendors is seen 
simply as a waste of money, with little to be gained in terms of social or political capital xix. 
The outcome has been an overabundance of high end retail developments, housing estates 
and commercial buildings. By way of example, Jakarta currently has around 40 traditional 
markets each of which can accommodate around 500 traders (20,000 in total), well short of 
the estimated 140,000-350,000 street vendors (Interview with Azas Tigor, Director of the 
Jakarta Residents Forum (FAKTA), Jakarta, 6 August 2010). This can be contrasted with the 
60+ medium to large sized shopping malls in Jakarta that are estimated to serve the needs of 
and be affordable for only around 500,000 residents, or 3.5% of Jakarta’s total population 
(Rukmana 2009a ). At the municipal level, each of Jakarta’s mayors has informally 
designated areas for street vendor activity, though with the high demand and price of land the 
trend has been towards reducing rather than increasing these. For example in December 2009 
in Central Jakarta there were 62 designated areas for street traders, down from 66 in February 
of the same year (Sabarini 2009). The rationale for the reduction of space despite an increase 
in demand was that it is necessary in order to ‘tidy up the city’ (Sabrini 2009).  
 
With the limitations and precariousness of legal space in which to operate, UIS workers 
takeover the streets, filling up sidewalks and alleyways and are subsequently subject to 
eviction, relocation or dislocation via regular ‘razia’ or raids conducted by Satpol PP public 
order officials. This enforcement is sporadic and usually conducted without prior negotiation, 
adding to the uncertainty of UIS workers and increasing the risk of conflict. There is 
significant evidence suggesting corrupt and collusive practices, in which Satpol PP clear 
vendors and poor communities on behalf of developers and so called ‘land mafia’; networks 
using intimidation, falsified land title documents and bribes to officials to acquire land 
(Human Rights Watch 2006). A 2009 report by the Indonesian human rights group Imparsial 
recommended that the Satpol PP be disbanded due to its systemic human rights violations in 
the enforcement of public order laws against vendors and disproportionate allocation of fiscal 
resources it receives (Imparsial 2009). In the 2007 Jakarta regional budget the Satpol PP was 
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allocated 303.2 billion (US$29.7 million) (Imparsial 2009) xx. This compares to 188 billion 
allocated for primary level education, 200 billion for government run health clinics and 64 
billion for the Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprises Agency, a body seen as 
crucial to the development of the UIS (Imparsial 2009). This huge investment in the Satpol 
PP, whose core function is the enforcement of the public order laws, indicates the prevailing 
attitude towards the UIS at the top levels of the Jakarta administration is that of illegal 
activity which obstructs more profitable forms of development.  It also reflects the prevailing 
matrix of interests that dominate policy formation processes and their selective enforcement, 
with the administration generously funding a force with the core function of clearing the 
streets of UIS workers and the urban poor.   
 
The social and economic outcomes of this criminalisation approach has been almost entirely 
negative, both for government and UIS workers, and linked to a range of social problems 
such as increased levels of urban poverty, street criminality, social conflict as well as a de-
legitimisation of government agencies xxi. Often left with nowhere else to go, evicted vendors 
simply move to another area, or return to their original site once things have ‘cooled down’, 
resulting in an ongoing pattern of ‘semi-nomadism’ within the city. In part this nomadism is 
inherent in the nature of street vending itself, which tends to congregate around pre-existing 
centres of activity (schools, transport terminals, business districts etc), rather than becoming 
the locus for an economic or retail hub in its own right xxii. According to Azas Tigor, Director 
of the Jakarta Residents Forum (FAKTA), the Jakarta administration has not recognised this 
central characteristic of street traders, hence the repeated failure of attempts to force them 
into the formal sector. For example the Jakarta City Market Authority (PD Pasar Jaya) has 
instigated a number of ‘vendor relocation programs’ aimed at removing vendors from the 
streets and situating them within market buildings (Wisnu 2009). Situated away from organic 
hubs of activity, or in direct competition with convenience chain stores, and often in high 
states of disrepair these markets have been unpopular both with consumers and vendors 
themselves. The high fees imposed for kiosks (anywhere between Rp.7-10 million per meter) 
has also been prohibitive (Wisnu 2009, Interview with PD Pasar Jaya official, Jakarta 12 
August 2009). Informality remains more profitable.   
 
The election of Fauzi Bowo as governor in 2008 brought some optimism amongst NGOs, 
residents forums and vendor associations that a more humane approach would be adopted 
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towards street vendors, however to date he has continued the confrontational and approach of 
his predecessor xxiii.  An example is the implementation of his plan to increase ‘green space’ 
in Jakarta from 9.6% to 13.9% by the end of 2010 (Rukmana 2009b) xxiv. As anyone who has 
spent time in Jakarta knows, public parkland is rare and much needed xxv. However as the 
NGO Indonesian Forum for the Environment (WALHI) and others have identified, the 
targets for reclaiming land for green zones have been overwhelmingly ‘soft’, such as squatter 
communities and existing vendor and street market sites, in short the urban poor and UIS 
workers (Khalid 2009). Examples include the eviction of long-established street traders in 
Jalan Barito, settlements surrounding the BMW Park in Tangerang and communities in 
Rawasari Cempaka Putih, Central Jakarta (Khalid 2009). On the other hand, a number of 
malls and shopping centres that have already been built on designated green zones (largely 
illegally and due to corruption) have neither been demolished (which according to the 
governor would be ‘impractical’) nor required to pay any compensatory fee or tax xxvi. 
Proposals for further mall developments on allocated green zones have also been allowed to 
reach formal assessment stages (Setiawati 2010).  
 
One major conceptual failing of the Green Zones concept, and spatial planning more 
generally, is that it does not incorporate residential areas or allow for either informal or 
regulated economic activity. Rather than ‘greening’ existing neighbourhoods, the strategy has 
been to clear designated green zones of human inhabitants putting further pressure upon 
surrounding areas. Organisations such as WALHI, Urban Poor Consortium and the Jakarta 
Residents Forum (FAKTA) have all developed detailed alternative planning models which 
have been submitted to the Jakarta administration for consideration however representatives 
of each stated that they had yet to receive a serious response (Interview with Wadah Hafidz 
(UPC) and Slamet Daroyni (WALHI), Jakarta, 10 August 2009).  Alternative plans from 
within the administrative bureaucracy have also been rejected after opposition from big 
business, such as the Jakarta City Parks agency’s proposal to develop green spaces at the site 
of 29 gas stations (Rukmana 2009 b). 
 
As Hudalah and Woltjer state, spatial planning processes are ‘coordinative in nature’, 
meaning that in practical terms it involves negotiations and deal making between public and 
private stakeholders (Hudalah and Woltjer 2007). Hudalah and Woltjer add that “there is no 
specific obligation of the government to invest or to finance the proposed development or 
land supply” (Hudalah and Woltjer 2007: 298), with the role of government primarily one of 
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making programmes to facilitate and guide investment and financing from the private sector. 
This reliance upon capital from the private sector fundamentally discriminates against the 
UIS, and makes planning processes and the allocation of permits and zoning highly 
susceptible to the distribution of favours, kickbacks and corruption. The outcomes, such as 
those identified previously, indicate the entrenchment of the prevailing matrix of interests 
and the ease with which market capital can determine the direction of planning priorities. 
When programmes are funded by the government, such as the vendor relocation programme, 
the imperative to recoup costs undermines the ostensive intent to provide vendors with 
affordable space.  
 
Organisation and (non)representation of the sector 
As we have seen, the lack of effective representation of UIS interests is due to a combination 
of the conceptual denial of the UIS by the administration together with the ease with which 
the interests of developers have been able to highjack and direct policy, and planning 
priorities, and outcomes. Difficulties in developing the kinds of organisation that could lead 
to effective lobbying and representation in policy making processes is further exacerbated by 
the diverse and expansive nature of the informal sector itself which poses its own limitations. 
This is not helped by existing labor policy which is implicitly based upon the idea of 
formalising the informal workforce. There has been some limited recognition within social 
welfare policy, such as in the extension of health insurance coverage to informal sector 
workers under the state run Jamsostek scheme. However the paradigm of formal sector 
conditions prevails with UIS workers paying more due to the absence of an employee 
contribution (International Labour Organisation, 2008). 
 
Another key issue is that of citizenship. Many UIS workers in Jakarta are legally ‘non-
citizens’ as they do not possess a Jakarta identity card. Failure to obtain one may be due to a 
number of factors, ranging from non-eligibility, prohibitive fees, absence of required 
documentation such as birth certificates or a general reluctance found within informal 
communities to interact with government officials. This has contributed to the disinterest of 
political parties, who do not see UIS workers as a significant potential voting constituency 
and have subsequently not made serious efforts to develop alternative policy strategies or use 
it as a campaign issue. Political ‘engagement’ has been largely restricted to the mobilization 
of UIS workers and the urban poor more generally during campaign periods. This non-
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existence also has significant implications to allocations of the regional budget, as it is only 
to be used for registered residents of Jakarta. 
 
There are a variety of sectoral organisations such as the Indonesian Street Traders 
Association who have attempted to engage in lobbying and advocacy on behalf of the UIS as 
a whole. National labour unions such as the Indonesian Prosperity Trade Union (Serikat 
Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia, or SBSI) have also made some efforts to extend to the UIS 
however these still remain partial and made problematic by its diverse and disparate nature 
(Social Alert 2005). Subsequently street vendors have not been adequately represented at this 
sectoral level. There are also numerous local and national level NGO’s and community 
groups doing grass roots organisation and advocacy that have achieved successes in terms of 
localised accommodation of the UIS. For example, the Jakarta Residents Forum (FAKTA) 
has lobbied at the local level for accommodation of vendors, and developed regular lines of 
communication with Jakarta’s current governor, Fauzi Bowo. It has also encouraged UIS 
workers to contest power directly at the local level, such as running for the lowest elected 
positions of formal authority in the administrative hierarchy like a Neighbourhood Unit head 
(Rukun Tetangga or RT) giving them potentially greater input over allocation of budget 
funds and space at the local level xxvii. FAKTA activists state that many lower level officials 
are highly sensitive and aware of issues facing the UIS, but are often hamstrung by the 
priorities and interests of those higher up in the administrative system xxviii. Another 
campaigner for the UIS is the Urban Poor Consortium (UPC). Established in 1997, the UPC 
has developing a network of community based collectives throughout Jakarta and  focused 
upon public demonstrations and education campaigns aimed at drawing public and media 
attention to the issue, together with efforts at lobbying the administration for a rights based 
approach to the UIS and the urban poor. The UPC links the situation of the UIS and urban 
poor to a broader critique of stalled political change in Indonesia and the entrenchment of 
oligarchic interests, a position which has not endeared it to many legislators or politicians xxix. 
 
The strength of the UIS lies in its rootedness in local communities, which does not translate 
well into the traditional top-down institutional model that still prevails in Indonesia nor to 
sectoral forms of representation via unions or NGOs. A variety of battles are being fought on 
local fronts throughout Jakarta, but this has not resulted in effective lobbying at higher levels 
of government. A significant amount of NGO and community activity amongst the UIS is 
focused upon developing various forms of self-sufficiency, such as local cooperatives. There 
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is a deep scepticism and hostility amongst vendors towards government, with the common 
view being that it only serves its own interests and those of the rich and powerful. The 
regular experience of violence and eviction at the hands of the Satpol PP and extortion by 
local officials have broken trust,  lines of communication and dialogue. For many UIS 
workers, vendors in particular, the avoidance of contact with state agents is a key concern, 
with their ultimate aim not transition to formal sector employment or even equitable state 
imposed regulation, but the ability to operate their enterprise free from government 
intervention and harassment. In confidential interviews with the author in 2009 street vendors 
frequently stated that “the state was of no use” and that “they are untrustworthy and don’t 
represent us”.  
 
In principle, limited opportunities for local input into planning and development priorities 
can arise in the context of engagement with government facilitated ‘participatory processes’ 
such as Development Planning Consultative Process (Musrenbang). Conducted annually 
through various levels of government Musrenbang are multi-stakeholder forums which are 
meant to encourage non-government stakeholders to participate in proposing, identifying and 
prioritizing development policies, and act as a mechanism through which to mediate 
differences between government and nongovernmental stakeholders (Djani, Wilson, Masduki 
2009). This local government development planning and budgeting mechanism replaces the 
top-down and non-participatory one of the Soeharto era. Proposals undergo further levels of 
screening at higher levels of the administrative hierarchy, and must be in accordance with 
pre-established government programs and core areas to be eligible for funding. Studies have 
shown however that the Musrenbang process has had limited success in incorporating grass 
roots and community based initiatives and inputs into planning priorities and directions with 
the actual levels of participation and its outcomes highly dependent upon the power relations 
between the actors and groups involved (Djani, Wilson, Masduki 2009). In Jakarta NGOs 
and community groups involved in Musrenbang complained that their participation was 
“window dressing” used to legitimate pre-determined agendas, echoing the findings of Djani, 
Wilson and Masduki’s study of the impact of patron-clientism of Musrenbang in other parts 
of the country (Group interview with Musrenbang participants, Jakarta, 11 August 2009).  
 
The inadequacy of policy instruments inhibits UIS workers from organising themselves 
effectively and they are dealt with by government agencies on an individual or localised 
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territorial basis. The top down model of policy instruments and the entrenched interests that 
benefit from this deprives them of a platform to voice their needs, while the inadequacy of 
institutional frameworks also hinders the potential of NGOs, advocacy groups and residents 
forums to act as effective intermediaries. Campaigning for improved conditions, insofar as it 
focuses on addressing specific grievances as distinct from holistic long term solutions, also 
narrows the potential constituency for any networks and relationships (alliances) as the basis 
for shifting power in such a way to enable the identified grievances to be addressed. The 
informal urban sectors conditions of existence and its grievances, as has been noted, are 
characterized by a localized and variegated reality, unlike the industrial/formal sector which 
can more easily mobilise around nation-wide demands, such as a generalized increase in 
wages. Subsequently, fragmentation of campaigning according to localized or otherwise 
relatively narrow issues remains a general characteristic of the various attempts to pressure 
governments for effective action.  In the case of the UIS and vendors in particular the natural 
location of organization (i.e. the workplace) intersects with public and private space, creating 
a complex web of tensions and conflicting interests.  
 
Conclusion 
There are a number of key issues underlying the problems surrounding the Jakarta 
administrations strategies towards the UIS. Firstly is the issue of recognition: the failure of 
local and national government to officially and fully recognise the informal sector as the 
predominant valid form of productive economic activity that not only provides a safety net 
against poverty (in the context of a country in which state welfare services are minimal), but 
also serves the needs of the cities poor and middle-classes. The importance of the informal 
sector has been regularly acknowledged at a national level, such as President Yudhoyono’s 
statement that in the wake of the 2009 economic crisis forced evictions of street traders 
should be ceased (Gatra 2009, Sabarini 2009). This pattern of calls by national and regional 
leaders to show lenience towards the UIS during periods of economic crisis and downturn 
displays an awareness of the sectors significance, if only as a safety net, however it has yet to 
be turned into either concrete legislation or policy xxx. It also fails to articulate the UIS’s 
important role in subsidizing “the consumption and profits of actors in the formal economy” 
(Centeno and Portes 2006 :15). Paradoxically, the generally low wages of the formal sector 
jobs created by developments such as malls means that these workers ultimately rely on the 
existence of the informal sector for goods and services xxxi.  
 
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM: POLITICS AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM  
13 - 14 DECEMBER, 2010 
MURDOCH UNIVERSITY, PERTH 
 
127 
Local instances of accommodation and allocation of space for street traders by individual 
mayors or sub-district heads for example, is also largely via informal negotiations and 
dependent upon the individual agency and will of those local leaders. As such it remains 
precarious and subject to termination when more powerful interests intervene.  The existence 
of both prohibitive and accommodative policies towards the UIS, such as the Public Order 
laws and Jakarta regional law No.2/2002 indicates the existence of tensions within 
government as to how best approach and manage the UIS. The failure to enforce the latter 
while the former is allocated significant resources suggests that powerful political and 
economic interests linked to the allocation and use of public space continue to sideline people 
orientated development despite the over-abundance of high end retail and housing servicing 
Jakarta’s economic and political elites. Ostensibly participatory forums such as Musrenbang 
are yet to achieve significant outcomes, in part due to problems of design but also due to high 
jacking by entrenched interests. This situation is compounded by the lack of a coherent or 
organised political lobby from the sector, either via sectoral and mass organisations, unions 
or representation via political parties. Local gains have been made and productive grass 
roots/local level advocacy is taking place, however this has yet to filter through and have an 




i. In 2002 the Jakarta Centre for Statistics estimated there to be 141,073 street vendors in 
Jakarta. Tempo (2002), ‘Kaki lima sebagai katup pengaman’, 24 February. The Institute for 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights estimated in 2007 that there were 200,000, while the 
Urban Poor Consortium suggests upwards of 350,000. Interview with Wadah Hafidz, 
Director of Urban Poor Consortium, Jakarta, 10  August 2010. One of the difficulties in 
establishing reliable figures is that official statistics are usually limited to those with Jakarta 
identity cards, whereas a large number of UIS workers do not possess one, and numbers are 
in a constant state of flux in particularly during periods of economic downturn or recession.  
ii. The Global Development Research Centre, ‘The Informal Sector: Definitions at a Glance’, 
http://www.gdrc.org/informal/1-ataglance.html.  
iii. The report estimates that 49% of all Indonesians earn less than US$2 a day. Of these as 
many as 22% in urban areas do not have access to safe water, and 59% no access to 
adequate sanitation (World Bank 2006).  
iv. This figure is based upon currency conversion rate of rp. 10,000 to US$1. 
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v. Suharto notes that while some informal enterprises can be relatively profitable, the 
proportion of poor households in the informal sector has remained constantly higher than in 
the formal sector. Edi Suharto (2002). 
vi. The World Bank estimates that nationally the population of Indonesia’s cities have trebled 
in the past 25 years (World Bank 2006: xxii) 
vii. This argument was most consistently put forward by Jakarta’s previous governor Sutiyoso.  
viii. According to research conducted by the Limnology Research Centre, of the 218 lakes 
found in Jakarta and its outskirts in 1990,  only four currently remain. See Kalinga 
Seneviratne, ‘Jakarta floods linked to illegal construction’, 
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=36725, 26 February 2007.  
ix. There is little evidence in Jakarta to suggest that either have been implemented or enforced. 
x. See for example Gatra, ‘Mendag: jangan gusur PKL’, (Minister for Trade: Don’t evict 
street vendors), 12 February 2009.  
xi. The mayor had 54 separate meetings with vendors, represented by nine vendor associations, 
over the space of seven months. As he explained “Clear-cut communication detailing the 
benefits of relocation overcame the vendors”.  
xii. Widodo also initiated a credit scheme by which small home based enterprises can borrow 
Rp. 4 million rupiah with 0.5% interest and gave vendors a 6 month exemption from tax.   
xiii. The positive embrace of the UIS was inspired by Widodo’s own background and 
experience as an antique and furniture trader rather than the result of effective lobbying or 
advocacy, drawing attention to the importance of individual agency. Other examples 
includes Gede Winasa, a former dentist and the regent of Jembrana who has implemented a 
comprehensive health insurance scheme for the poor. 
xiv. In 1978 long before either of the public order laws were passed, Regional Regulation No.5 
1978 carried specific reference to management and operation of PKL in Jakarta, 
designating authority to the governor to determine where PKL could legally operate. The 
regulation was never revoked, meaning that legally the governor still has the legal power to 
allocate spaces for street vendors. The regulation also lays responsibility for orderliness and 
cleanliness with vendors themselves, in stark contrast to the prohibitive tone of the 1988 
and 2007 public order laws, but which also lay ultimate authority with the governor.  
xv. The history of hostility towards the UIS and street vendors in particular extends back to the 
governorship of Ali Sadikin (1966-1977) who considered street based enterprise a potential 
threat to public order and as signs of a “backward society”.  Sadikin, A. (1977), Gita Jaya: 
Catatan H. Ali Sadikin, Gubernur Kepala Daerah Khusus Ibu Kota Jakarta 1966-1977, 
Pemda Ibu Kota Jakarta, Jakarta. Even earlier President Sukarno  
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xvi. New migrants who failed within 14 days to register and obtain a visitors identity card, 
which requires proof of formal employment and residence, were liable to imprisonment and 
heavy fines.  
xvii. According to activists form the Urban Poor Consortium and FAKTA, retail developers 
frequently sidestep the law by hosting one week street vendor festivals, but not establishing 
any permanent space.  
xviii. Interview with Nurkholis Hidayat, Director of the Jakarta Legal Aid Foundation, 7 August 
2009. Examples of violations of the law include Senayan City Mall and the second Plaza 
Indonesia Mall. The exclusion zone for chain convenience stores such as Alfamart or Circle 
K is less than 1km.  
xix. Interview with Nukholis Hidayat, Director of the Jakarta Legal Aid Foundation, 7 August 
2009 
xx. This figure is based upon currency conversion rate of rp. 10,000 to US$1 
xxi. Confidential interview with retail developer, Jakarta, 10 August 2009. 
xxii. Yearly ‘anti-thug’ campaigns, ostensibly aimed at tackling gangs and petty crime, regularly 
target street traders together with street children, beggars and buskers.    
xxiii. Interview with Azas Tigor, director of the Jakarta Residents Forum (FAKTA), 6 August 
2009.  
xxiv. This initial optimism came from a number of pro-poor and residents advocacy groups who 
had developed productive lines of communication with Bowo when he was vice-governor. 
His status as an ethnic Betawi, the so called indigenous population of Jakarta, also led these 
groups to think he may show amore compassion towards street vending particularly in 
Betawi communities.   
xxv. ‘Green space’ is defined in legislations simply as “areas where plants can grow” (Rukmana 
2009a). 
xxvi. Green space in Jakarta was roughly 35% in 1965. The target of 13.4% is still significantly 
below the stipulated minimum of 30% established in the 2007 Spatial Planning Law. In 
2008 the allocated budget for green conversion of Rp. 2.6 billion was also significantly 
reduced, all but eliminating the possibility that the 2010 target would be met and increasing 
the imperative to focus upon ‘soft target’ evictions of poor communities. Deden Rukmana 
(2008), ‘Decreasing green areas in Jakarta’, The Jakarta Post, 17 March.  
xxvii. Examples include the Senayan City Mall and Sudirman Palace as well as malls in Kelapa 
Gading, Pantai Kapuk, Sunter, Senayan, and Tomang.  
xxviii. Interview with Azas Tigor (FAKTA), Jakarta 6 August 2009. 
xxix. Ibid. 
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xxx. During Sutiyoso’s period as governor the UPC in particular were subject to physical 
intimidation and attack at the hand of ethnic militias working on behalf of the 
administration. See Wilson 2006. 
xxxi. Some urban poor activists have suggested that these statements, referred to as ‘himbauan’ 
or appeals are purely populist and aimed at appeasing and diverting public anger during 
periods of economic uncertainty.  
xxxii. Average shop attendant wage in Jakarta is around the minimum wage of Rp.1.2 million per 
month.  See Doja Fasila, (2010),’Rise in minimum wage to fall far below union’s demands’, 
The Jakarta Globe, 13 October, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/rise-in-jakarta-
minimum-wage-to-fall-far-below-unions-demands/401254 (accessed 14 November 2010).  
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